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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a 
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court (nee Fifth Circuit 
Court) for Salt Lake City, the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, 
Judge, presiding on the charges under the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City of Battery, in violation of Section 32-1-
3, R.O.S.L.C., and Destruction of Property, Section 32-3-4, 
R.O.S.L.C. Authority for this appeal is provided in Section 
78-2-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether defendant Nelson's requested instruction is 
a correct statement of relevant applicable law. 
II. Whether defendant Nelson properly preserved his 
right to appeal on the question of the Court's refusal to 
give the requested instruction. 
III. Whether the Court committed reversible error in 
refusing to give defendant Nelson's requested instruction in 
the absence of any evidence supporting the instruction. 
GOVERNING LAW 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Section 77-35-19, Utah 
Code Annotated 
77-35-19- Rule 19 - Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written request that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the request. At the same time 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to 
the other parties. The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the 
request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may 
be given orally, or otherwise waive this 
requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented 
and given, or refused, the court shall 
endorse its decision and shall initial or 
sign it. If part be given and part refused, 
the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given 
and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objected and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court refers 
to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the 
jury that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties 
shall be made after the court has instructed 
the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, 
any limitation upon time for argument shall 
be within the discretion of the court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City agrees with the appellant's "Statement of the 
Facts11 insofar as the statement accurately recites the 
testimony adduced from the witnesses at trial. Unlike the 
usual case where the losing party's self-serving testimony 
would be irrelevant on an appeal, consideration of defendant 
Nelson's testimony is, in this case, relevant to the issue 
of the Court's refusal to give the requested instruction. 
While the City does agree with the factual recitation 
of the testimony, the City strongly disputes the ante- and 
penultimate paragraphs of the "Statement of Facts" in the 
Brief of Appellant dealing with the requested instruction. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 4.) The entire colloquy between the 
Court and counsel for defendant Nelson concerning the 
requested instruction is set out below. 
JUDGE: Thank you very much, we appreciate 
your service and your now free to go, thank 
you. Mr. Mack would you wish sentencing at 
this time or would you wish sentencing at a 
later date. 
DM: Well, now is fine your Honor, I also 
have an objection I'd like to put on about 
the instructions. 
JUDGE: Yes, muhuh (yes). 
DM: Okay, I asked the court to include an 
instruction that would use as a defense the 
fact that if the jury found that Mr. Nelson 
was engaged in potential mutual combat or 
altercation that that be a basis for 
acquittal. I think that there was some 
evidence to support that theory. The 
evidence stated by the officer of that the 
two were arguing with each other and in his 
estimation that they had been involved 
together in this. Or ask, I guess it would 
depend on the definati n of altercation which 
is not clear but it's my understanding of the 
law that if there's any evidence to support 
the defendants theory of the case that the 
defendant is entitled to put an instruction 
supporting that theory and I think that there 
was some evidence. 
(Transcript, p. 148-9. Errors uncorrected.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant Nelson's proposed instruction dealing 
with "mutual combat" or "consensual altercation" is totally 
inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The 
requested instruction, admittedly drawn from Section 76-5-
104, U.C.A., is irrelevant to a battery charge under the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Even if the 
instruction somehow stated relevant law defendant Nelson 
failed to preserve his objection as required by Rule 19, 
U.R.Crim.P. No record of the instruction, or objection to 
its not being given, exists prior to the jury verdict of 
guilty. Further, given the entirety of the remaining 
circumstances the Court's failure to give the irrelevant 
unsupported instruction is not manifest error allowing this 
Court to review absent proper preservation. 
2. The Court did not err in refusing the give the 
requested "mutual combat" instruction as there was no 
evidence to support the instruction. Refusal to give an 
instruction is only reversible if the defendant shows that 
substantial evidence was presented in support of the refused 
instruction sufficient to raise in the minds of the jurors a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. The best 
evidence in support of the defendant's instruction is 
presumably summarized in defendant's Brief which indicates 
no such mutual consent to a savage beating. Further, the 
incompetent phraseology of the requested instruction would 
have required the jury to find the mutual altercation beyond 
reasonable doubt to exculpate the defendant. Given the 
facts of the case such a finding would have been impossible, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT NELSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RAISE THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS 
IRRELEVANT AND NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED. 
Defendant Nelson admits in his Brief ff[t]he language of 
the [requested] instruction is taken from Utah Code Ann, 
§76-5-104 . . . ." (Brief of Appellant, p. 6.) Defendant's 
counsel makes a Procrustean leap of logic arguing that since 
the cited statute only precludes the consensual altercation 
defense in the event of homicide of assault charges 
concomitant with the use of a deadly weapon that therefore, 
ipso facto, such a defense is always otherwise available. 
Notwithstanding the absolute factual non-support for the 
requested instruction (discussed in Point II below) the 
instruction is wholly irrelevant to this case. 
Section 76-5-104, by its own terms, deals with 
prosecutions under the Utah Criminal Code. The prosecution 
in the instant case was for violation of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City for battery. As such, the 
consensual altercation provisions of the Utah Code are 
irrelevant. 
Further, it has been generally held that "mutual 
combat" provisions do not mean merely fights or scuffles. 
"Mutual combat" generally involves deadly weapons in a fight 
on serious terms usually ending in murder or manslaughter. 
Donaldson v. State, 249 Ga. 186, 289 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1982); 
People v. Neal, 112 lll.App.3d 964, 446 N.E.2d 270, 274 
(1983). 
Given the deadly serious nature of the intended "mutual 
combat" contemplated by a "mutual combat" statute it is 
plain that the intent of the Legislature in passing Section 
76-5-104 was to preclude the defense. The purpose what not, 
as contemplated by the twisted logic of defendant Nelson, to 
allow a disfavored defense in case of a fight less serious 
than a "duel". 
Even if the instruction was somehow relevant law, 
defendant Nelson failed to properly preserve his objection. 
Defendant Nelson's Brief nowhere cites any objection to the 
Court's refusal to give the requested instruction which, as 
would have been required, occurred before the jury was 
instructed. The only record of any objection is contained 
in the transcript cited above in the Statement of Facts. 
This clearly shows the objection occurred after the jury 
verdict was reached. 
Whether or not defendant Nelson's counsel in fact 
properly objected to the Court's refusal to give the 
instructions "stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection" is simply not in 
the record before this Court. (Rule 19, U.R.Crim.P.) It is 
the duty of defendant's counsel to property preserve the 
record for his appeal to this Court. Snyderville 
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 
1980); Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 
(1970). This appeal is based on legal rulings, not on any 
Fourth Amendment denial of effective representation. As 
such, the Court cannot review what it does not have before 
it. 
Finally, given the clear irrelevance of the 
instruction, the failure of preservation and the factual 
weaknesses which will be described below, the Court's 
refusal to give the requested instruction is not "manifest 
error" allowing this Court to review absent proper 
preservation. "Manifest error" was best discussed in the 
murder case of State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 
(1936). In that case, the trial judge made an actual error 
in the instruction and used the words "murder in the first 
degree" when he intended to use the words "voluntary 
manslaughter." Cobo, supra at 959. Without defining 
"manifest error" the Supreme Court ruled that such an 
inadvertent mistake in the charge was clearly a manifest 
error allowing review even without proper preservation. 
Cobo remains good law, unfortunately without significant 
further elucidation as to the meaning of "manifest error." 
See, State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976). 
Given the irrelevance of the proposed instruction and 
its lack of preservation this Court should dismiss the 
appeal solely on procedural grounds. If, however, the Court 
chooses to review the substance of the evidence allegedly 
supporting the requested instruction the propriety of the 
trial court's ruling will only become clearer. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERROR 
BECAUSE THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE INSTRUCTION. 
Throughout his Brief defendant Nelson appears to argue 
that if he has adduced at trial a mere scintilla of 
tangentially connected evidence he is therefore entitled to 
have the jury instructed with any badly written, irrelevant 
and unsupported instruction he so chooses. In that 
contention defendant Nelson is not supported by the law nor 
by the facts. 
The standard for determining whether or not a refusal 
to give an instruction is reversible error is, by now, so 
well known as to be the subject of mere Per Curiam opinions. 
The standard requires four elements: 
1. A burden on the defendant; 
2. To show substantial evidence; 
3. Supporting the refused instructions; 
4. Sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the 
minds of the jurors as to the defendant's guilt. 
State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985). The converse of that 
standard is also good law: 
If the evidence is so slight as to be 
incapable of raising any reasonable doubt in 
the jury's mind as to whether defendant acted 
[as requested in the proposed instruction] 
then the tendered instruction was properly 
refused. 
McKenna, supra at 985. State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 
457 P.2d 618 (1969); State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 
1981). 
Applying the standards above there is simply no 
question of the weight of the evidence supporting defendant 
Nelson's requested instruction. Not only is there no 
"substantial evidence", there is simply no evidence. 
The requested instruction would have required the jury 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Nelson and 
Melissa Fonnesbeck were both parties to either a "duel, 
mutual combat, or other consensual altercation." (Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum B.) Not even defendant Nelson contends 
that Ms. Fonnesbeck and he engaged in a "duel". Therefore 
the instruction is only factually supported if there is 
substantial evidence of either "mutual combat" or 
"consensual altercation". 
As noted above "mutual combat" is generally defined to 
be more than a mere fight or scuffle usually, instead, 
involving deadly weapons and mutual intention of using them. 
Another possible definition of "mutual combat" is raised in 
6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery §69, "where two persons 
engaged in a fight by mutual agreement for the purpose of 
testing who was the best man . . . ." The City was unable 
in its research to find a case defining "consensual 
altercation". However, under the statutory principles of 
construction known as noscitur a sociss and ejusdem generis 
the undefined phrase "consensual altercation" should be read 
as merely another way of describing an event similar to a 
"duel" or "mutual combat." 
Given the words and their meaning in the proposed 
instruction the next step in the analysis must be to apply 
the facts of the case to determine whether they support the 
proposed instruction. The best factual support for the 
proposed instruction would, presumably, be found in 
defendant's Brief. That evidence is summarized in two 
paragraphs on page 2 of the Brief. Essentially, after 
defendant Nelson chased another man away from Ms. 
Fonnesbeckfs apartment Ms. Fonnesbeck began yelling at him 
"while standing in the rain clad only in a robe (T. 122)." 
As a result of that terrible provocation of being yelled at 
by somebody in a robe in the rain defendant Nelson picked 
Ms. Fonnesbeck up over his shoulder like a sack of potatoes 
about to be mashed and carried her inside over her 
struggling, kicking and hitting protests. 
While the argument continued (unsurprisingly) inside 
the house defendant Nelson broke Ms. Fonnesbeck?s nose with 
his hand. That, in its entirety, is defendant Nelson's best 
evidence. (Brief of Appellant, p. 2.) 
From the evidence it is unclear what defendant Nelson 
contends supports the "mutuality" or "consensuality" of the 
altercation. What was it? Was it standing outside in the 
rain? Was it standing outside in the rain in a robe? Was 
it struggling, kicking and screaming while being manhandled 
like a sack of potatoes? Was it continuing the argument 
inside? To argue, as defendant Nelson does, that any of the 
conduct of Ms. Fonnesbeck constitutes evidence of a "duel, 
mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" is as 
absurd, heartless and insupportable as can be imagined. 
Many analogies come to mind but the Court can surely fill in 
its own. 
Finally, even if there were some evidence supporting 
the "mutual combat" instruction the inept and incompetent 
phraseology of the instruction would render the trial 
court's refusal to give it harmless. As written by 
defendant's counsel, the instruction would have required the 
jury to find the "duel, mutual combat, or other consensual 
altercation" beyond a reasonable doubt. The City has no 
idea where the "reasonable doubt" standard came from in the 
proposed instruction. (The error of this phraseology, and a 
lack of any record discussion of it, further buttresses the 
City's argument that this appeal should be dismissed on the 
procedural grounds raised in Point I above.) 
Even in the event of a properly requested "self-
defense" instruction the burden is not on the defendant to 
establish "self-defense" beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
fact, the defendant's burden may fall "far short of 
establishing the justification or excuse by a preponderance 
of the evidence upon the subject." State v. Noel, 712 P.2d 
To claim, as defendant Nelson does, that his testimony is 
supported by the Salt Lake City police officer's description 
of a "typical family fight" is ludicrous. (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 3-4.) The mere fact that two parties are 
engaged in familial warfare does not mean that both parties 
are "consenting" to be beaten. Defendant Nelson's insulting 
argument, carried to its logical extremes, would vitiate any 
spousal, or for that matter, child abuse cases. People 
almost always swing back when being beaten if only to 
protect themselves. 
211, 214 (Utah 1985), quoting State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 
181, 120 P. 497, 502 (1911).2 
Given the ridiculously high standard of proof which the 
requested instruction would have imposed on the defendant 
and the minuscule factual support for the defense any error 
by the Court was totally harmless. Even with the 
instruction as written, the jury could not possibly have 
found any verdict other than guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Nelson's proposed instruction was legally 
irrelevant, factually unsupported, factually unsupportable, 
improperly preserved, ineptly written and, in any case, 
thoroughly harmless. As such, the Court should dismiss this 
appeal and sustain the jury's verdict if guilty. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 1989. 
BRUCE R. BAIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
Again, the City feels constrained to point out that this 
appeal is based on legal issues rather than any Fourth 
Amendment denial. 
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